In an interview with Al Akhbar in 27 December, the spokesman for Houthi-ad forces said that the coalition has violated the ceasefire several times since its start in 13 December. He also said they have evidence that the coalition is transferring Al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorists from Syria to use them as their proxies in their war against the Houthis as part of a two million-dollar agreement with the terrorists. [150] Both sides will probably try to spoil the agreement. At this point, however, the Houthis are the main obstacle to progress. Under the terms of the Stockholm agreement, the Houthis must take the first step by redeploying troops from the three major Red Sea ports; the two sides will then have to carry out a number of reciprocal redeployments of the critical humanitarian infrastructure and, finally, from the entire city to designated positions, which will effectively demilitaris the entire Red Sea trade corridor. Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi blamed the assault on Western inaction, saying that the British assured them a week earlier that no coalition troops would attack Hudayda “without their agreement and assistance.” [46] Houthi spokesman Abdul Salem also stated that aggression in the West Coast “lacks moral and social values, so the aggressors resort to media show off and psychological warfare”. [73] 1- An agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa. Following the talks on Sweden, the UN was forced to hastily hold a ceasefire in Hodeida governorate, which began on 18 December. But the parties did not agree with the ground rules. Unlike most ceasefire agreements, the agreement did not contain technical details on the extent, nature or duration of the cessation of hostilities; Definition of offences; or mechanisms to quickly stop the fight when it starts again. The failure of such an agreement – probably because of the urgency of an agreement – has had negative consequences. What complicates matters further is that the UN has not yet deployed a full surveillance team – which requires the approval of the Security Council – making the fate of the ceasefire vulnerable to the war of narratives that has mostly tormented attempts to build a peace process. On the other hand, the SM is trying to completely separate ties with the Yemeni state.

The STC condemned the Stockholm trial for ignoring southern issues and reiterated its calls for secession. Houthi leaders, in turn, accused the UAE and the SM of trying to scuttle the agreement. Although international recognition of southern Yemen`s independence is unlikely, the Hadi government does not have the military means to withdraw control from the South, which is the scene of future conflicts. The first term was an “agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa,”[18] which, first and foremost, agreed to an “immediate cease-fire” and then a “redeploy mutualment of forces” in these areas. [19] Subsequently, the second mandate of the agreement, as defined in both the Hodeidah Agreement and the Taz Agreement, was intended to “open humanitarian corridors to enable”[23] to “facilitate the free movement of civilians and goods”. and the delivery of humanitarian aid. [24] Here, the Stockholm Agreement helps with regard to the Yemeni government and the Houthi fighters who have agreed to the conditions.